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A SYSTEMS-BASED MODEL AND PROCESSES FOR INTEGRATED
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS (I-SMS)
Diogo Silva Castilho
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Boston - MA
The study of the vulnerabilities of a system is often organized in a hazard
analysis. Methods based on systems thinking are relevant tools to analyze the
operation of modern products. The purpose of this research is to develop,
implement, and validate a systems-based model for aviation Safety Management
Systems (SMS) incorporating the treatment of collected data to foster the
effectiveness of mitigating measures over time. The model uses data monitoring
systems, management of change reports, flight inspections, voluntary reports, and
other sources as input messages to an Active Hazard Analysis. The new
requirements, constraints, and the preventing and mitigating measures are
organized and delivered timely to the operators. The analysis on unstable
approaches found contributions to documentation and procedures in practice. In
accordance with SMS standards, the new framework provides organized safety
information for management, fostering better planning on the use of workforce
and resources.
Complex operations defy cognitive limitations. Safety-critical systems face accidents
when these limits are unknown or ignored. A careful hazard analysis provides the knowledge
that is necessary to reduce the risks. However, in dynamic systems, experience could generate
negative learning, and even a thorough knowledge of the initial condition in which the system is
delivered is not enough to guarantee safe operations.
The lifetime of an aircraft is expected to be long. A new airliner might endure more than
four decades of operation. Throughout its lifetime, different generations of pilots, flight
attendants, and mechanics will operate all the equipment developed for the system. This system
comprised of hardware, software, and operators with different cultures will change over time
because the environment and the mindset of operators will change. Technology will impact
operations as upgrades of components, new functionalities, and different levels of automation are
implemented. The challenge becomes to assure safety for operations when assumptions made at
the beginning of the project are no longer valid.
The first efforts for hazard analysis should start during ConOps (Concept of Operations).
In this phase, engineers need to make assumptions about how operators will interact with the
product, and some of these assumptions will become obsolete. For example, the Boeing 777
entered into service in 1995. Back then, it would be impossible to imagine that airlines would be
using electronic flight bags (EFB) or tablets1. It is easy to believe that this is a natural evolution
EFBs and off-the-shelf tablets are accepted to be integrated to the dashboard to substitute all paper charts and manuals
(FAA InFO, 2011)
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in hindsight, but there was no smartphone when the aircraft was certified. The operational
lifetime needs to be used to update the assumptions previously made, and consequently, the
hazard analysis.
Safety Management Systems
The concept of an SMS (Safety Management System) was introduced in commercial
aviation as a formal, top-down, organization-wide approach to manage safety risk and assure the
effectiveness of safety risk controls. This perspective aims to make aviation even safer, but the
processes within SMS leave room for improvement. It does consider software controlled systems
and higher levels of automation, but it fails to proactively monitor the impacts of human factors
and changes in the environment. It focuses on risk assessment (accident prediction) (FAA, 2016)
rather than using a hazard analysis for accident prevention.
SMS is a new requirement for air operations, maintenance, and air traffic services. Annex
19, the document that formalized this initiative, is the first new ICAO (International Civil
Aviation Organization) Annex to come out in over thirty years. All aviation organizations must
show compliance with Annex 19 before November 2019, but there are a variety of ways to do it.
The ICAO and the FAA offer manuals to guide Safety Risk Management (SRM) and Safety
Assurance (SA), but there is no orientation on the use of hazard analysis at the organizational
level.
There are tools based on Systems Theory that could be added to SMS. These techniques
consider the operator's behavior to be the result of social, psychological and even environmental
conditions. The mapping of actions applied to a controlled process and the analysis of the
feedback that the operator is receiving provide a qualitative understanding of the real issues
behind the unsafe behavior.
This research links systems engineering and management actions that are necessary to
comply with SMS. In this context, we answered the following research question: How to apply
systems-based concepts to collect aviation operational data and update a hazard analysis? The
solution was the introduction of the Integrated Safety Management System (I-SMS) as a model
to guide safety managers using concepts from Systems Engineering.
The purpose of this research was to develop and implement a systems-based model of
safety management incorporating the treatment of collected data to foster the effectiveness of
mitigating measures over time. This model has a general framework that the safety manager can
adjust to each specific system.
This model work as a method to monitor safety in operations to maintain a higher level of
safety by using an active hazard analysis. The foundation for the I-SMS is STAMP (SystemsTheoretic Accident Model and Processes), which is based on Systems Theory. STAMP is a
modern model of causation that has proven to be successful in aviation. I–SMS is the model that
improves the completeness on the application of STAMP techniques.
Systems-Theoretic Process Analysis (STPA) is the hazard analysis technique based on
STAMP (Leveson, 2011). STPA covers not only the accidents caused by component failures but
also the ones caused by a faulty interaction between components of a system that are each
functioning properly, as a consequence of system design flaws. It recognizes safety and security
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as emergent properties of a complex system caused by the interaction of its components. The
main characteristic of security is the malicious intentions behind control actions. However, safety
is a more general term, and it is affected by both well-intended operators and the ones attacking
the system. The STPA is complemented by organizing assumption-based leading indicators
(Leveson, 2015) to register the reasoning behind performance indicators.
Integration of Hazard Analysis and SMS
Proactive management requires effective communication and monitoring activities. The
proposed solution is the use of a structure that puts the hazard analysis at its core to feed the
decision making of higher hierarchical levels with new indicators and their trends.
The hazard analysis performed during system development becomes the structure that
will be in constant evolution as it is revisited during the whole lifetime of a system. The output
of this active hazard analysis adapts the organization to a dynamic reality. The general
framework of the I-SMS is presented in figure 1.
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Figure 1. I-SMS general framework.
On the left side, there are many different sources of input to the Active Hazard Analysis.
The verification and validation tests become opportunities to add to the hazard analysis the
details that developers did not consider when the product was just an abstract idea. When the
system is already delivered and operating, changes initiate a process that requires revisiting the
hazard analysis to avoid surprises. Incidents and accidents are seen as potential learning events.
Also, the system must be open to voluntary contributions. The stakeholders’ participation
regarding hazardous conditions works both to enhance the system and to foster a safe attitude,
keeping the organization awareness aligned with its culture.

195

On the right side, the output of the active hazard analysis feeds the hazard management
and its preventive and mitigating actions that update the system’s information flow, bringing it to
a safer state. However, changing the documentation without understanding the operator’s needs
and difficulties is not effective management. It is essential to apply the mitigating measures
considering how and when critical information is delivered to operators because it will be better
assimilated if presented at a proper time.
A manager must guarantee that the information generated by the active hazard analysis
will arrive at the desired destination, communicated to and understood by everyone who should
have it, and applied to the system. Those tasks demand an observant manager to assure that all
previous work is effective. Without monitoring the information flow, an accident could occur
due to a causal factor that was identified and treated, but the measures to prevent it were not
correctly followed over time.
The proper implementation of the model to a specific system requires tailoring the
general framework. That means that each box of the general framework will need another
particular label. Once this structure is drawn, the tasks are divided into the application of four
processes. The following processes guide the organization of effective actions on management
activities.
Process 1 - Communication Protocol for Sensitive Data
Proactive measures to prevent accidents require effective channels to communicate safety
information. This goal is obtained only if all stakeholders use the same language. The format of
the input message for the Active Hazard Analysis has a complete description of an event that
starts with the context, lists all actions of each controller chronologically, and explain the
reasoning for the decisions taken as reported by each controller.
Process 2 - Active Hazard Analysis Update
The input message from any source is treated to verify if the hazard analysis is
incomplete or if it was not respected. In the first case, the safety manager conducts a systematic
procedure to update the hazard analysis. In the second case, the analyst investigates why the
rules were not followed to adapt the prevention or mitigating measures or to enforce them. In
both cases, management acts preventively to avoid future losses. The list of actions and
controllers from the previous process become a reference to relate the event with the correct part
of the hazard analysis. The identified mental models are discussed to reason on assumptions
previously made. The assumptions are updated, followed by the scenarios and measures derived
from it.
Process 3 - Hazard Management
Currently, most aeronautical product development organizations use risk assessments to
decide how to prioritize mitigating measures and to judge if it is worth taking action. This risk
management is the evaluation of both on-going and new initiatives in a systematic attempt to
address areas with the potential to pose a risk to safety during operations.
The concept of an “acceptable level of safety” is expressed by two measures required by
ICAO: Safety Performance Indicators (SPI) and Safety Performance Targets (SPT). These
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solutions are in place because the company top management requires measurable safety targets
that are acceptable to regulators and other stakeholders, and consistent with the SMS.
The problem is that, without a structured hazard analysis, the selection of SPIs and SPTs
is subjective and relies only on the experience of a few managers. Systems Engineering provides
qualitative ways to manage hazards and the analysis result on the elaboration of SPIs that will
explain if the system is drifting to a more hazardous status. In other words, the new set of SPIs
diagnose the safety culture of the organization and verify if communication channels are
effective.
Process 4 - Prevention & Mitigation
The strategy for mitigation involves a range of possible actions including:
-

Revision of the system design with changes to the functional control structure.
Modification of operational procedures.
Re-arrangements of staffing.
Training of personnel to specific scenarios.
Development of emergency and contingency plans.
Ceasing operation.

All updates of the hazard analysis will result in changes in the company’s documentation.
Most safety critical organizations have standard procedures that are taught during training and
enforced throughout the operation. They culturally become rules to avoid blame.
The desired safe behavior requires building mental models to facilitate proper actions
when specific conditions are detected and recognized. It also requires responding signs of those
conditions that alert about the proximity to hazard. That becomes necessary as humans are
affected both by an excess of information, that causes high workload and stress, or lack of
information, which leads to low situation awareness and distractions. Most systems have hazards
related to both extremes, but prevention is possible if human factors are properly considered.
The solution is to organize the required safety knowledge into communication events that
occur at different moments. Each communication opportunity has specific characteristics. The
four categories and their vehicles presented in the general framework are a proposed reference
that should be adjusted to the desired system:
-

-

-

Training: The first opportunity to teach and to present limitations and rules has the
benefit of a mind clearer of biases and preconceptions. The study of manuals must
have a set of information regarding safety reasonably complete. That will be used to
form the mental models and to serve as a consultation source during operation.
Planning: The time dedicated to plan a set of actions (e.g., a mission in military
activities) is opportune to communicate safety concerns to operators. The addition of
safety information during the planning activity reduces surprises and the variability of
improvisations.
Setup: When the task is complex and requires a fast and accurate response, the
operator prepares himself or herself recalling the mental models and remembering the
responses for off-nominal situations. In many systems, checklists are tools that deal
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-

with memory limitations. New technology solutions provide multiple ways to feed
up-to-date information in dynamic systems.
Operation: In dynamic phases of operations, there is no time to search for the
manual or to read an order. The solution for the communication of safety information
is the use of cues that can be aural or visual. They must be simple, recognizable and
unequivocal.

Alerting System
In the I-SMS framework, the voluntary reports are classified into two different types:
Hazard Analysis update and Condition Alert. In the hazard analysis update, the safety officer
receives the description of the situation observed by the operator to perform the reasoning
described in Process 2. In the second case, time-critical observations, such as a drone crossing
the runway final approach, potentially dangerous environmental phenomena, or even criminal
actions, require extra instant communication. Instant messages called Condition Alerts are
transmitted using software solutions and connectivity to alert other operators.
Case Study and Conclusion
A complete STPA on unstable approaches was used as basis for the I-SMS. This project
had the participation of major airlines in the USA, Brazil, Europe, and Asia. To avoid the
correlation of companies with unsafe events, all data was condensed in one single database and
analyzed altogether. The airlines provided flight monitoring data, pilot reports, observation
flights, and investigation reports on unstable approaches for landing.
The outcomes of the project included more robust documentation for training, a better
understanding of the vulnerabilities of airline operations, a more complete hazard analysis, a
more explicit allocation of responsibilities, optimized enforcement mechanisms, and the
observation of new trends that gives the feedback that is required for proper management.
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